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BEYOND THE TORRENS MIRROR: A FRAMEWORK OF 
THE IN PERSONAM EXCEPTION TO INDEFEASIBILITY 
TANG HANG WU* 
[One of the central tenets of the Torrens system is that the registered proprietor is conferred 
indefeasible title. Indefeasibility of title is subject to an in personam exception. The content of the in 
personam exception to indefeasibility has been a source of debate in many Torrens jurisdictions. The 
purpose of this article is to map out a theoretical structure to analyse the ambit of the in personam 
exception so as to provide a principled development of the law in this area. This article will also 
attempt to explain how this proposed theoretical structure of the in personam exception deals with 
constructive trust claims, knowing receipt, undue influence, unconscionable dealing, duress and 
certain restitutionary claims.] 
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I   INTRODUCTION 
The central feature of the Torrens system of land registration is the principle 
that the registered proprietor has ‘indefeasible title’.1 Every land lawyer knows 
that ‘indefeasible title’ is shorthand for the notion that a registered proprietor’s 
 
 * LLB (NUS), LLM, PhD (Camb); Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, National University of 
Singapore. I am grateful to Matthew Harding, Lyria Bennett Moses, Koh Swee Yen, Barry 
Crown and the two anonymous referees who gave me many helpful suggestions on how to 
improve this article and saved me from many errors. My gratitude also goes out to Tan Choog 
Ing, who helped me proofread earlier drafts of this article. Finally, the students in my ‘Principles 
of Property Law’ class deserve special mention for inspiring this article with their frequent 
questions on the in personam exception. The usual caveats apply. 
 1 This has been described as the ‘foundation of the Torrens system’: Bahr v Nicolay [No 2] (1988) 
164 CLR 604, 613 (Mason CJ and Dawson J) (‘Bahr’). See also Matthew Harding, ‘Bar-
nes v Addy Claims and the Indefeasibility of Torrens Title’ (2007) 31 Melbourne University Law 
Review 343. For a fascinating background of the Torrens system, see P Moerlin Fox, ‘The Story 
behind the Torrens System’ (1950) 23 Australian Law Journal 489. See also Mary-Anne Hugh-
son, Marcia Neave and Pamela O’Connor, ‘Reflections on the Mirror of Title: Resolving the 
Conflict between Purchasers and Prior Interest Holders’ (1997) 21 Melbourne University Law 
Review 460; Lynden Griggs, ‘Torrens Title — Arise the Registered and Unregistered, Befall the 
Legal and Equitable’ (1997–98) 4(1) Deakin Law Review 35. 
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title is paramount — it cannot be defeated by a prior unregistered interest (except 
in certain categories prescribed by statute).2 In the memorable words of Ed-
wards J in Fels v Knowles: ‘The cardinal principle … is that the register is 
everything’.3 By conferring on the registered proprietor an indefeasible right to 
the land, the Torrens land regime ‘save[s] persons dealing with [the] registered 
proprietor from the trouble and expense of going behind the register, in order to 
investigate the history of their author’s title’.4 As such, the Torrens system is said 
to enshrine the ‘mirror principle’ — the register effectively reflects all interests 
affecting the land.5 
However, the Torrens philosophy that the ‘register is everything’6 is inevitably 
subject to certain qualifications. Apart from the statutory exceptions to indefea-
sibility, there are also non-statutory exceptions which are collectively known as 
the ‘in personam’ or ‘personal equities’ exception.7 The existence of the in 
personam exception was clearly enunciated by Lord Wilberforce in the Privy 
Council (on appeal from the New Zealand Court of Appeal) in the case of 
Frazer v Walker ,  where his Lordship said ‘that [the] principle [of indefeasibility 
of title] in no way denies the right of a plaintiff to bring against a registered 
proprietor a claim in personam, founded in law or in equity, for such relief as a 
court acting in personam may grant.’8 Similarly, Barwick CJ observed in 
Breskvar v Wall: 
Proceedings may of course be brought against the registered proprietor by the 
persons … setting up matters depending upon the acts of the registered proprie-
tor himself. These may have as their terminal point orders binding the regis-
tered proprietor to divest himself wholly or partly of the estate or interest 
vested in him by registration and endorsement of the certificate of title …9 
While the existence of an in personam exception is uncontroversial, what is 
unclear and has been a source of fertile debate is the precise content of the in 
personam exception.10 Besides a valid contractual obligation freely entered into 
by the registered proprietor, what other personal claims may be brought against 
them? The purpose of this article is to map out a theoretical structure to analyse 
the ambit of the in personam exception that is consistent with the Torrens system 
 
 2 See Sir Anthony Mason, ‘Indefeasibility — Logic or Legend?’ in David Grinlinton (ed), Torrens 
in the Twenty-First Century (2003) 3, 4–5. 
 3 (1906) 26 NZLR 604, 620 (Edwards J for Denniston, Edwards, Cooper and Chapman JJ). 
 4 Gibbs v Messer [1891] AC 248, 254 (Lord Watson for the Court). 
 5 Theodore B F Ruoff, An Englishman Looks at the Torrens System: Being Some Provocative 
Essays on the Operation of the System after One Hundred Years (1957) 7–8. 
 6 Fels v Knowles (1906) 26 NZLR 604, 620 (Edwards J for Denniston, Edwards, Cooper and 
Chapman JJ). 
 7 Many commentators have pointed out that the term ‘personal equities’ is somewhat of a 
misnomer because this category encompasses common law as well as equitable claims: see, eg, 
Peter Butt, Land Law (5th ed, 2006) 788; Barry C Crown, ‘A Hard Look at Bahr v Nicolay’ in 
Dora Neo, Tang Hang Wu and Michael Hor (eds), Lives in the Law: Essays in the Honour of 
Peter Ellinger, Koh Kheng Lian and Tan Sook Yee (2007) 191, 201. 
 8 [1967] 1 AC 569, 585. See also Barry v Heider (1914) 19 CLR 197; Butler v Fairclough (1917) 
23 CLR 78, 91 (Griffith CJ); Abigail v Lapin [1934] AC 491, 500 (Lord Wright). 
 9 (1971) 126 CLR 376, 384–5. 
 10 See, eg, Lyn Stevens and Kerry O’Donnell, ‘Indefeasibility in Decline: The In Personam 
Remedies’ in David Grinlinton (ed), Torrens in the Twenty-First Century (2003) 141. 
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of land registration.11 This article will also attempt to explain how this proposed 
theoretical structure of the in personam exception deals with constructive trust 
claims, knowing receipt, undue influence, unconscionable dealing, duress and 
certain restitutionary claims.12 
I I   TWO VIEWS ON THE IN  PERSONAM EXCEPTION 
A  The Narrow and Wide View of the In Personam Exception 
Before setting out my framework of the in personam exception, it is helpful to 
sketch out the differing opinions in this area. There are basically two differing 
views found in the case law and academic literature on the in personam excep-
tion. One view, which I term as the ‘narrow view’, is that the in personam 
exception ought to be interpreted restrictively because it has the potential to 
undermine the principle of indefeasibility. Such an approach is exemplified by 
Lynden Griggs’13 and Barry Crown’s work.14 For example, Griggs argues that to 
widen the in personam exception to indefeasibility to include claims in knowing 
receipt is to introduce the ‘tectonic plate of equity’ which will create a fault line 
that makes the ‘foundation of [the] Torrens [system] unstable and unclear.’15 
Such a restrictive view of the in personam exception is also found in the case law 
and academic literature in Singapore, which adopts a Torrens system of land 
registration.16 Crown argues that ‘[t]he notion of an “[in personam] claim” or “a 
personal equity” is inherently vague. Its general adoption … would pose a threat 
to one of the central planks of the Torrens system.’17 This narrow approach has 
recently found judicial favour in the Singapore Court of Appeal in United 
Overseas Bank Ltd v Bebe bte Mohammad (‘Bebe’).18 Chan Sek Keong CJ, after 
a careful examination of the legislative history and provisions of the Torrens 
system in Singapore,19 held that the courts should be slow to engraft the concept 
of personal equities on the Singapore Torrens system.20 In Chan Sek Keong CJ’s 
view, the various statutory exceptions to indefeasibility found in the Singapore 
 
 11 See below Part III. 
 12 See below Parts IV–VII. 
 13 Lynden Griggs, ‘The Tectonic Plate of Equity — Establishing a Fault Line in Our Torrens 
Landscape’ (2003) 10 Australian Property Law Journal 78. 
 14 Barry C Crown, ‘Equity Trumps the Torrens System: Ho Kon Kim v Lim Gek Kim Betsy’ [2002] 
Singapore Journal of Legal Studies 409. 
 15 Griggs, ‘The Tectonic Plate of Equity’, above n 13, 82. See also Lynden Griggs, ‘In Personam, 
Garcia v NAB and the Torrens System — Are They Reconcilable?’ (2001) 1 Queensland Univer-
sity of Technology Law and Justice Journal 76. 
 16 Land Titles Act, cap 157, 2004 rev ed (Sing). 
 17 Crown, ‘Equity Trumps the Torrens System’, above n 14, 415 (citations omitted). 
 18 [2006] 4 SLR 884. For a discussion of this case, see Barry C Crown, ‘Back to Basics: Indefeasi-
bility of Title under the Torrens System’ [2007] Singapore Journal of Legal Studies 117. 
 19 Bebe [2006] 4 SLR 884, 915–17. For a background of the Torrens system in Singapore, see John 
Baalman, The Singapore Torrens System (1961); Sook Yee Tan, Principles of Singapore Land 
Law (2nd ed, 2001) 189–99. 
 20 Bebe [2006] 4 SLR 884, 920. 
     
2008] A Framework of the In Personam Exception to Indefeasibility 675 
     
Torrens statute,21 such as fraud, forgery and contract, were more than capable of 
dealing with most in personam actions in common law and in equity.22 
In contrast, the wide view of the in personam exception does not perceive any 
contradiction between the concept of indefeasibility and the pursuit of personal 
claims against the registered proprietor. An example of the wide approach is 
evident in the New Zealand Court of Appeal decision of C N & N A Davies 
Ltd v Laughton (‘Laughton’).23 In that case, Thomas J, writing for the Court, was 
of the opinion that the in personam exception ‘sits comfortably with the concept 
of indefeasibility. … It is essentially non-proprietary in nature. The key element 
is the involvement in or knowledge of the registered proprietor in the uncon-
scionable or illegal act or omission in issue.’24 In a similar vein, Professor Robert 
Chambers also argues for a wider view of the in personam exception to include 
unjust enrichment claims — that is, claims in duress, undue influence, mistake 
and the like.25 According to Chambers, such an approach does not conflict with 
the overarching objective of the Torrens system.26 Chambers draws a distinction 
between three-party cases and two-party situations.27 In the former, the defen-
dant becomes the registered proprietor by the fraud or forgery of a third party, 
whereas in two-party cases the property is transferred directly from the plaintiff 
to the defendant.28 Chambers argues that in three-party cases the defendant 
obtains indefeasible title, whereas in two-party cases the plaintiff ought to be 
able to bring a restitutionary claim against the defendant.29 He makes a distinc-
tion between two inquiries: (1) investigation into the quality of the vendor’s title; 
and (2) an investigation into the validity of the transaction through which title 
was obtained.30 Chambers contends that it is only the former inquiry that the 
Torrens system was designed to simplify.31 If a defendant knew or ought to have 
 
 21 Land Titles Act, cap 157, 2004 rev ed (Sing) s 46(2). 
 22 Bebe [2006] 4 SLR 884, 920. It has been suggested that the Singapore Torrens jurisprudence is 
unique because the law has been statutorily codified: see, eg, Barry Crown, ‘Indefeasibility of 
Title: Developments in Singapore’ (2007) 15 Australian Property Law Journal 91. As such, the 
in personam exception may have a smaller role to play in Singapore. Ultimately, I find this 
argument unconvincing for a number of reasons. First, such a construction of the law would lead 
to a very strained interpretation of fraud and the other statutory exceptions to indefeasibility. It is 
not clear how in personam claims such as undue influence and resulting trust ‘fit’ within such a 
narrow interpretation of the Torrens system. Secondly, it should be pointed out that Chan Sek 
Keong CJ in Bebe [2006] 4 SLR 884, 917–20 did not totally reject the concept of the in per-
sonam exception. His Honour merely said that the courts should be slow to engraft the concept 
of personal equities into the Singapore Torrens system. It might very well be that if the argu-
ments made in this article were ventilated in the Singapore Court of Appeal, the Singapore 
courts might accept a principled development of the in personam exception. 
 23 [1997] 3 NZLR 705. 
 24 Ibid 712. 
 25 Robert Chambers, ‘Indefeasible Title as a Bar to a Claim for Restitution’ [1998] Restitution Law 
Review 126. For support of this argument, see Jonathan P Moore, ‘Equity, Restitution and In 
Personam Claims under the Torrens System’ (Pt 2) (1999) 73 Australian Law Journal 712; 
James Edelman and Elise Bant, Unjust Enrichment in Australia (2006) 352–5. 
 26 Chambers, ‘Indefeasible Title as a Bar to a Claim for Restitution’, above n 25, 131. 
 27 Ibid 129. 
 28 Ibid 129–30. 
 29 Ibid 130. 
 30 Ibid 133–4. 
 31 Ibid 134. 
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known that the plaintiff transferred the property while operating under mistake, 
duress or undue influence, then the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining restitution 
should prevail over the defendant’s security of receipt.32 Thus, Chambers 
proposes a rule whereby: 
A defendant who acquires a registered interest in Torrens land from a plaintiff, 
with notice of the facts giving rise to the plaintiff’s claim for restitution of that 
interest ([that is,] notice that the interest is an unjust enrichment at the plain-
tiff’s expense), should not be protected from that claim by the principle of in-
defeasibility.33 
B  Reviewing the Narrow Approach to the In Personam Exception 
It is suggested that an extremely narrow approach is undesirable for a number 
of reasons. First, such an approach straitjackets the development of the law in 
many areas, especially in the context of remedies. For example, under this 
narrow approach to the in personam exception, a proprietary response — the 
declaration of a constructive trust — is not possible as a potential remedy to a 
claim for breach of confidence34 or as a response to a situation where a Pal-
lant v Morgan35 equity is said to arise. To develop this argument further, it is 
necessary to consider the following hypothetical facts. Suppose the plaintiff and 
the defendant enter into confidential negotiations to acquire and jointly develop 
a piece of land. In breach of confidence, the defendant purchases the land 
concerned in their own personal capacity and becomes the registered proprietor. 
The plaintiff sues the defendant for breach of confidence and/or alleges that a 
Pallant v Morgan equity has arisen, and prays for a declaration of a constructive 
trust over that piece of land.36 In this context, is a plea of indefeasibility of title a 
complete defence to a claim for a constructive trust? Under the narrow approach, 
a defendant who becomes a registered proprietor would be able to rely on the 
assertion of indefeasibility of title to defeat a prayer for a constructive trust. 
While it is conceded that in many Commonwealth jurisdictions the declaration of 
a constructive trust in respect of an abuse of confidence37 or a Pallant v Morgan 
equity is still very much a contested issue,38 the point is that the result of a 
restrictive approach to the in personam exception would be to rule out the future 
development of proprietary remedies for pre-existing and new causes of action. 
 
 32 Ibid. 
 33 Ibid. 
 34 See LAC Minerals Ltd v International Corona Resources Ltd (1989) 61 DLR (4th) 14 (‘LAC 
Minerals’). 
 35 [1953] 1 Ch 43. 
 36 This scenario is based loosely on the facts of LAC Minerals (1989) 61 DLR (4th) 14. 
 37 For a critique of LAC Minerals (1989) 61 DLR (4th) 14, see Tang Hang Wu, ‘Confidence and 
the Constructive Trust’ (2003) 23 Legal Studies 135. See also Duncan Sheehan, ‘Information 
Tracing Remedies and the Remedial Constructive Trust’ [2005] Restitution Law Review 82; 
Matthew Conaglen, ‘Thinking about Proprietary Remedies for Breach of Confidence’ (2008) 12 
Intellectual Property Quarterly 82. 
 38 See Nicholas Hopkins, ‘The Pallant v Morgan “Equity”’ [2002] Conveyancer and Property 
Lawyer 35. The Pallant v Morgan equity has been cited in Australia in: Esber v Massih [2006] 
NSWSC 321 (Unreported, Hall J, 26 April 2006); Seyffer v Adamson (2001) 10 BPR 19 349. 
     
2008] A Framework of the In Personam Exception to Indefeasibility 677 
     
Another vivid example in support of the argument above is the issue of receipt 
of bribes by a fiduciary. How would the narrow approach to the in personam 
exception deal with the example of a fiduciary who accepts bribes and uses the 
bribes to buy land? If the decision in Attorney-General (HK) v Reid (‘Reid’) is 
correct, then a constructive trust may be declared in favour of the principal over 
the land acquired by a fiduciary through their ill-gotten gains.39 However, if one 
takes an extremely narrow view of the in personam exception, the fiduciary who 
is breach of their duty technically has the defence of indefeasibility of title to a 
constructive trust claim. This illustration again demonstrates how a dogmatic 
view of indefeasibility precludes the proper development of the law. Therefore, it 
is suggested that the narrow approach to the in personam exception is imprudent 
because it limits the law’s capacity to fashion appropriate remedial responses in 
many areas in the law of obligations to meet changing social circumstances. In 
the context of the development of proprietary remedies, rather than precluding 
the consideration of appropriate proprietary remedies with a bright line rule, it is 
better to have a principled and thorough inquiry into whether such remedies are 
justified in that particular context and whether the grant of such proprietary 
remedies does in fact fatally undermine the principle of indefeasibility. 
The final criticism of the narrow approach to interpreting the in personam 
exception is that it will inevitably lead to an expansion and, ultimately, a strained 
construction of the concept of Torrens fraud and the other statutory exceptions to 
indefeasibility. For example, how would the narrow approach deal with the 
problem of undue influence as presented by cases such as Garcia v National 
Australia Bank Ltd (‘Garcia’)40 or Royal Bank of Scotland v Etridge [No 2] 
(‘Etridge’)41 where undue influence is alleged by one party (usually the wife) 
against another (usually the husband)? In this scenario, the wife will usually try 
to set aside the security given to the bank, which is a registered mortgagee. One 
possible solution is to say that the registered proprietor in this case (the bank) is 
guilty of Torrens fraud since the registered proprietor did not take the necessary 
steps to ensure that no undue influence had taken place. But such an analysis 
could be criticised as a strained extension of the concept of Torrens fraud. As 
Bryan rightly observes, it would be impossible to bring many of these cases 
‘within the fraud exception to indefeasibility, at any rate without severe concep-
tual distortion.’42 Ultimately, the same result is achieved under the narrow 
approach to the in personam exception by forcibly shoehorning various causes of 
actions into the concept of Torrens fraud and other statutory exceptions. 
 
 39 [1994] 1 AC 324. See also Daraydon Holdings Ltd v Solland International Ltd [2005] Ch 119. 
Reid [1994] 1 AC 324 has been followed in Australia in Zobory v Federal Commissioner of 
Taxation (1995) 64 FCR 86; Mainland Holdings Ltd v Szady [2002] NSWSC 699 (Unreported, 
Gzell J, 22 August 2002). Cf Darrel Crilley, ‘A Case of Proprietary Overkill’ [1999] Restitution 
Law Review 57. 
 40 (1998) 194 CLR 395. 
 41 [2002] 2 AC 773. 
 42 Michael Bryan, ‘Recipient Liability under the Torrens System: Some Category Errors’ (2007) 26 
University of Queensland Law Journal 83, 97. See, eg, Bebe [2006] 4 SLR 884, 913, where 
Chan Sek Keong CJ, delivering the judgment of the Singapore Court of Appeal, opined that 
fraud could be imputed on facts similar to Bahr (1988) 164 CLR 604. 
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C  Reviewing the Wide Approach to the In Personam Exception 
The wide approach to the in personam exception, as currently articulated, is far 
from satisfactory. Recall that Thomas J said in Laughton that the key element to 
in personam liability ‘is involvement or knowledge of … [an] unconscionable or 
illegal act’.43 The latter limb of Thomas J’s test — mere knowledge on the 
registered proprietor’s part — is almost certainly too wide to be utilised as a 
guiding principle in relation to the in personam exception. This formulation is 
inconsistent with the hallowed Torrens principle of absolving the registered 
proprietor from liability based on actual or constructive notice.44 It is interesting 
to note that Chambers has apparently modified his view expressed in the 
Restitution Law Review.45 In his new edition of An Introduction to Property Law 
in Australia, Chambers now makes a distinction between rights consistent with 
indefeasibility and rights that detract from indefeasibility.46 In the former 
category, Chambers gives the example of a settlor who transfers property to the 
defendant to hold on trust for the settlor’s family.47 The trust fails for some 
reason. Chambers argues that in this case, there should not be any problem in 
saying that the registered proprietor holds the property on resulting trust for the 
settlor. The resulting trust does not interfere with the indefeasibility of the legal 
title transferred by the settlor.48 Chambers concedes that, in some cases, the right 
to restitution ‘appears to be a direct assault on the principle of indefeasibility.’49 
He notes that ‘the courts have not yet resolved this conflict satisfactorily.’50 
Chambers’s earlier thesis mooted in his article in the Restitution Law Review 
— that in a two-party situation an unjust enrichment claim may be brought 
against the registered proprietor who has notice that the interest transferred is an 
unjust enrichment at the plaintiff’s expense — is too broad to be used as a 
general principle.51 Chambers’s strategy of imposing liability on the defendant 
based on the defendant’s notice of facts giving rise to the plaintiff’s claim for 
restitution is unworkable because such an analysis flies too close to the wind of 
constructive notice. Needless to say, the doctrine of constructive notice is 
inconsistent with Torrens jurisprudence. Chambers’s new argument found in his 
textbook which distinguishes between rights consistent with indefeasibility and 
rights that detract from indefeasibility appears to be a more promising analysis. 
Unfortunately, Chambers does not develop this argument fully and does not 
 
 43 [1997] 3 NZLR 705, 712 (emphasis added). 
 44 See, eg, Real Property Act 1900 (NSW) s 43(1). 
 45 See above Part II(A). 
 46 Robert Chambers, An Introduction to Property Law in Australia (2nd ed, 2008) 468–70. 
 47 Ibid 468. 
 48 Ibid. 
 49 Ibid. 
 50 Ibid. 
 51 There is some dispute as to whether Australian jurisprudence accepts an all-embracing theory of 
unjust enrichment. Some scepticism with the unjust enrichment principle was expressed by 
Gummow J in Roxborough v Rothmans of Pall Mall Australia (2001) 208 CLR 516, 543–5. See 
also Ben Kremer, ‘Restitution and Unconscientiousness: Another View’ (2003) 119 Law Quar-
terly Review 188; Joachim Dietrich, ‘Giving Content to General Concepts’ (2005) 29 Melbourne 
University Law Review 218, 230–4. 
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explain why certain rights that apparently detract from the principle of indefeasi-
bility can be used to set aside a registered proprietor’s title. 
Chambers now seems to take the position that, save for the resulting trust 
example mentioned earlier, all restitutionary claims necessarily detract from the 
principle of indefeasibility. It is suggested that this view is not entirely correct. 
Some restitutionary claims do weaken the principle of indefeasibility in sub-
stance. These claims should therefore usually be precluded. But it is my conten-
tion that not all restitutionary claims (and other personal claims) have the same 
effect. The challenge is then to differentiate between personal claims which do 
detract from the principle of indefeasibility and those that do not. This will be 
tackled below in Part III. In certain instances, such as the Garcia or Etridge 
scenario where a claim of undue influence is alleged against the husband to set 
aside the security against the bank, the claim does in fact undermine the principle 
of indefeasibility of title. However, in these cases the social utility of allowing 
such claims is greater than that of upholding the Torrens philosophy of indefea-
sibility. This point will also be developed below in Part III. 
I I I   A FRAMEWORK OF THE IN  PERSONAM EXCEPTION 
Before sketching out the proposed framework of the in personam exception, it 
is helpful to clear some of the ground with regard to the confusing terminology 
used in this context. The category of permitted causes of action against the 
registered proprietor has sometimes been termed as the ‘in personam’ excep-
tion52 or the ‘personal equities’ exception.53 However, both terms are a misnomer 
because these causes of action are not really exceptions to the principle of 
indefeasibility. The idea of indefeasibility of title does not necessarily preclude 
personal actions being brought against the registered proprietor based on their 
conduct. Nevertheless, it is probably the case that these terms have been used 
both in the case law and in academic commentaries for too long for them to be 
totally abandoned. Between these two terms, it is suggested that the nomencla-
ture personal equities is more misleading than the term ‘in personam exception’. 
Any long-suffering land law teacher will know that newcomers to the field are 
apt to confuse the term ‘personal equities’ with the concept of mere equities.54 
This will then lead to the misconception that only equitable actions may be 
brought against the registered proprietor.55 As such, the term ‘in personam 
exception’ is used in this article. 
Unfortunately, the term ‘in personam exception’ is also not totally free from 
ambiguity. A frequent source of confusion to a beginner is whether a personal 
claim with a proprietary consequence may be brought against the registered 
 
 52 Frazer v Walker [1967] 1 AC 569, 585 (Lord Wilberforce for the Court); Oh Hiam v Tham Kong 
(1980) 2 BPR 9 451, 9 454 (Lord Russell). 
 53 Breskvar v Wall (1971) 126 CLR 376, 385 (Barwick CJ). 
 54 Bryan, ‘Recipient Liability under the Torrens System’, above n 42, 96. See also Diane 
Skapinker, ‘Equitable Interests, Mere Equities, “Personal” Equities and “Personal Equities” — 
Distinctions with a Difference’ (1994) 68 Australian Law Journal 593. 
 55 See Butt, Land Law, above n 7, 788; Janice Gray et al, Property Law in New South Wales 
(2nd ed, 2007) 308. 
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proprietor.56 It is possible to work out the answer to this question on first 
principles. The use of the term ‘in personam’ was probably meant to distinguish 
such a cause of action from an ‘in rem’ action.57 As Dr Robinson reminds us, the 
distinction between the two actions is that ‘[a] right in personam could only be 
enforced against the person creating it but a right in rem was enforceable against 
the whole world (including the creator).’58 In the context of the Torrens system, 
the old rules pertaining to most in rem actions have been displaced by statutory 
provisions. There appears to be prima facie no conceptual difficulty (save for 
some exceptions which will be articulated below in this Part) to bring an in 
personam claim with a proprietary relief against the registered proprietor if the 
claim arises from the registered proprietor’s conduct. An ubiquitous example is a 
situation where the registered proprietor enters into a specifically enforceable 
contract of sale with the defendant. In this case, the defendant’s right of specific 
performance falls within the in personam exception.59 
The salient features of the proposed framework of the in personam exception 
are as follows: 
1 The prima facie position is that personal claims may be brought against the 
registered proprietor unless such claims directly or indirectly undermine the 
principle of indefeasibility of title.60 
2 The claims which are brought against the registered proprietor must, in most 
cases, be a known claim either in law or equity.61 This requirement does not 
mean that the courts are forever precluded from developing new causes of 
actions or proprietary responses to meet changing social needs with respect to 
Torrens land. However, such novel causes of action or proprietary responses 
must be principled, supported by precedent and not dependent on vague no-
tions of unconscionability. 
3 The personal claims brought against the registered proprietor must arise from 
the personal conduct of the registered proprietor.62 Moreover, such conduct 
must amount to something more than merely becoming the new registered 
proprietor.63 
 
 56 See Elizabeth Cooke and Pamela O’Connor, ‘Purchaser Liability to Third Parties in the English 
Land Registration System: A Comparative Perspective’ (2004) 120 Law Quarterly Review 640, 
649. 
 57 See Andrew Tipping, ‘Commentary on Sir Anthony Mason’s Address’ in David Grinlinton (ed), 
Torrens in the Twenty-First Century (2003) 21, 23. 
 58 S Robinson, ‘Claims In Personam in the Torrens System: Some General Principles’ (1993) 67 
Australian Law Journal 355, 355 (citations omitted). 
 59 See Breskvar v Wall (1971) 126 CLR 376, 385 (Barwick CJ). 
 60 Vassos v State Bank of South Australia [1993] 2 VR 316 (‘Vassos’). 
 61 See, eg, Grgic v Australian & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (1994) 33 NSWLR 202, 222–3 
(Powell JA) (‘Grgic’); Garofano v Reliance Finance Corporation Pty Ltd (1992) NSW ConvR 
¶55-640, 59 662–3 (Meagher JA) (‘Garofano’). 
 62 See, eg, Breskvar v Wall (1971) 126 CLR 376, 384–5 (Barwick CJ); Bahr (1988) 164 CLR 604, 
613 (Mason CJ and Dawson J), 638 (Wilson and Toohey JJ), 653 (Brennan J). 
 63 Skapinker, above n 54, 597. It has been suggested to me that there must be some form of 
wrongdoing on the part of the registered proprietor before a personal claim may be brought. This 
suggestion is correct in most cases. However, in some situations such as in Allcard v Skinner 
(1887) 36 Ch D 145 where there is a case for actionable undue influence, it is not entirely clear 
whether the defendant may be characterised as a wrongdoer. Despite absence of wrongdoing, it 
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4 Something more than ‘the bare fact of forgery (and thus an absence of assent) 
must be shown to found any in personam action’.64 
5 In most cases, the personal claim against the registered proprietor does not 
affect the title of the registered proprietor. Instead, if the claim succeeds the 
registered proprietor would have to compensate the plaintiff in monetary 
terms. However, the registered proprietor’s title may be affected in respect of 
certain claims against them where the plaintiff is entitled to either a remedy 
of specific performance or a declaration of a constructive trust.65 
6 The personal claim brought against the registered proprietor must not 
undermine the principle of indefeasibility of title in substance. This is essen-
tially a question of fact. If the registered proprietor has done no more than 
register their title, then no personal claim ought to succeed against them. 
7 In very limited cases, the personal claim is allowed against the registered 
proprietor even though it does detract from the principle of indefeasibility. 
These are instances where the personal claim protects an extremely compel-
ling private law interest which overrides the policy of certainty in land trans-
actions. An example of this is the case involving vulnerable persons in a fa-
milial relationship who provide security to a bank in favour of their partners. 
However, courts should be extremely wary in expanding this category of 
personal claims because these claims have the potential to destabilise the 
Torrens system. 
There are a few important qualifications to the proposed framework of the in 
personam exception. First, it is suggested that the courts should move away from 
analysing the in personam exception using the language of unconscionability. 
For example, Hayne J in Vassos v State Bank of South Australia (‘Vassos’) said 
that in personam remedies are ‘a clear reference to the remedies being available 
in circumstances where equity would act, ie, in cases which equity would 
classify as unconscionable or unconscientious.’66 This analysis, which is 
premised on unconscionability, appears to have been endorsed by subsequent 
decisions in Australia67 and New Zealand.68 But as McMurdo J correctly points 
out in White v Tomasel, the use of the criterion of unconscionability should not 
be understood as requiring an element of unconscientiousness in every in 
personam exception claim.69 Otherwise, ‘the rights of a purchaser under an 
uncompleted contract for the sale of a registered interest would not be enforce-
 
is suggested that if the novice nun in Allcard v Skinner (1887) 36 Ch D 145 had transferred 
registered land to the Mother Superior in circumstances of undue influence, the transaction 
should have been set aside. 
 64 Vassos [1993] 2 VR 316, 333 (Hayne J). 
 65 Breskvar v Wall (1971) 126 CLR 376, 384–5 (Barwick CJ). 
 66 [1993] 2 VR 316, 333. 
 67 See Story v Advance Bank Australia Ltd (1993) 31 NSWLR 722; Grgic (1994) 33 NSWLR 202, 
217 (Powell JA); Macquarie Bank Ltd v Sixty-Fourth Throne Pty Ltd [1998] 3 VR 133, 162 
(Ashley AJA) (‘Sixty-Fourth Throne’); LHK Nominees Pty Ltd v Kenworthy [2002] 26 WAR 
517, 552 (Murray J) (‘LHK Nominees’). 
 68 Laughton [1997] 3 NZLR 705; Duncan v McDonald [1997] 3 NZLR 669, 682 (Blanchard J for 
the Court). 
 69 [2004] 2 Qd R 438, 455–6. 
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able’ because a contractual obligation does not depend on the proof of unconsci-
entious behaviour.70 Thus, Lyria Bennett Moses is right to argue that the re-
quirement of unconscionability probably does not add very much to the analysis 
of the in personam exception.71 I would go even further than Moses and argue 
that the requirement of unconscientiousness is apt to mislead and should be 
abandoned in the context of the in personam exception.72 This requirement 
seems to imply that the court has an inherent jurisdiction to create an exception 
to indefeasibility when it feels that the conduct of the registered proprietor is 
unconscientious. But as Justice Gummow, writing extra-judicially, has said: ‘the 
use of the terms “unconscionable” and “unconscientious”, without more, cannot 
supply an equity to relief where otherwise none exists.’73 It is hard to disagree 
with Jonathan Moore, who argues that: 
A vague and amorphous concept such as unconscionability would, if sufficient 
on its own to defeat a registered interest in land, drive a horse and buggy 
through the Torrens system. This is precisely the reason why the courts have 
insisted that a personal equity must be founded upon a recognised legal or equi-
table cause of action.74 
When analysing the in personam exception, it is also important to finally 
abandon any reliance on the much criticised case of Mercantile Mutual Life 
Assurance Co Ltd v Gosper (‘Gosper’).75 In Gosper, the registered proprietor, 
Mrs Gosper, had a pre-existing mortgage with Mercantile Mutual Life Assurance 
Co Ltd (‘Mercantile’).76 Mr Gosper fraudulently caused a variation of the 
mortgage with Mercantile for an additional amount by forging Mrs Gosper’s 
signature.77 Mercantile dealt exclusively with Mr Gosper and solicitors who 
purported to act for Mrs Gosper on the matter of the variation of the mortgage.78 
The variation was duly registered. Subsequently, Mrs Gosper brought proceed-
ings for the register to be rectified. Mahoney JA, with Kirby P agreeing,79 held 
that a personal equity had arisen against Mercantile because Mercantile had 
produced the certificate of title in its possession to the New South Wales 
 
 70 Ibid 456 (McMurdo J). 
 71 Lyria Bennett Moses, ‘Recipient Liability and Torrens Title’ (2006) 1 Journal of Equity 135, 
139. 
 72 However, it is not suggested that established causes of action in equity which involve the 
umbrella principle of unconscionability are not within the in personam exception. Such equitable 
actions which can be construed to be within the in personam exception include proprietary 
estoppel, unconscionable dealings and mistake as exemplified by Commercial Bank of Austra-
lia v Amadio (1983) 151 CLR 447 and Minister for Education and Training v Canham (2004) 
NSW ConvR ¶56–080. 
 73 W M C Gummow, ‘Equity and the Torrens System Register’ in David Grinlinton (ed), Torrens in 
the Twenty-First Century (2003) 51, 51 (citations omitted). 
 74 Jonathan P Moore, ‘Equity, Restitution and In Personam Claims under the Torrens System’ (Pt 1) 
(1998) 72 Australian Law Journal 258, 260. 
 75 (1991) 25 NSWLR 32. For a discussion of this case, see David Sonter, ‘Mercantile Mutual Life 
Assurance Co Ltd v Gosper’ (1992) 15 University of New South Wales Law Journal 546; Peter 
Butt, ‘Indefeasibility and Sleights of Hand’ (1992) 66 Australian Law Journal 596. 
 76 (1991) 25 NSWLR 32, 39 (Mahoney JA). 
 77 Ibid. 
 78 Ibid 50 (Meagher JA). 
 79 Ibid 37–8. Meagher JA dissented: at 50–3. 
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Registrar-General to obtain registration of the variation.80 This, it was held, was 
an unauthorised use of the certificate and hence gave rise to the personal equity 
against Mercantile.81 The time has come to finally acknowledge that the reason-
ing in Gosper is simply wrong.82 Gosper is inconsistent with the basic principle 
that in order to invoke the in personam exception, the plaintiff has to demon-
strate that they have a recognised legal or equitable cause of action — an 
unauthorised use by the mortgagee of the certificate of title is not a recognised 
legal or equitable cause of action. However, the result reached in Gosper is 
probably correct, although the reasoning of the case is suspect. If the facts of this 
case were to arise today, it is most likely that Mrs Gosper would have pleaded 
and succeeded in obtaining relief under the doctrine of Garcia.83 Be that as it 
may, it is time for the courts to explicitly reject the reasoning in Gosper because 
the manner in which Mahoney JA approached the in personam exception, in the 
words of a leading commentator, ‘undermines confidence in the Torrens [sys-
tem].’84 
Another important point to note is that if the defendant became a registered 
proprietor pursuant to a contract with the plaintiff, the defendant’s title may be 
subject to attack if the plaintiff can show that the contract can be set aside due to 
the presence of a vitiating factor.85 This proposition follows from the reasoning 
that indefeasibility of title does not preclude a person from enforcing a valid 
contract against a registered proprietor. The symmetrical position must also be 
true: a registered proprietor’s indefeasibility of title should not be a defence if the 
plaintiff can show the presence of a vitiating factor in the underlying contract 
which gave rise to the transfer of title. Thus, the plaintiff is not precluded from 
setting aside the defendant’s title or receiving damages on recognised contractual 
grounds such as misrepresentation, mistake,86 duress, unconscionable dealing 
and undue influence. However, not all vitiating factors may be asserted against 
the defendant. It has been held that lack of capacity on the part of the transferor 
which was unknown to the registered proprietor does not impeach their title.87 
With regard to the plea of non est factum, there appear to be conflicting authori-
ties on whether an assertion of indefeasibility prevails over this defence.88 On 
 
 80 Ibid 48–9. 
 81 Ibid. 
 82 Crown, ‘A Hard Look at Bahr v Nicolay’, above n 7, 202, 203. 
 83 (1998) 194 CLR 395. See generally L G Tyler, P W Young and C E Croft, Fisher and Light-
wood’s Law of Mortgages (2nd ed, 2005) 347–52; Andrew Phang and Hans Tjio, ‘From Mythical 
Equities to Substantive Doctrines — Yerkey in the Shadow of Notice and Unconscionability’ 
(1999) 14 Journal of Contract Law 72. 
 84 Butt, ‘Indefeasibility and Sleights of Hand’, above n 75, 597. 
 85 See L L Stevens, ‘The In Personam Exceptions to the Principle of Indefeasibility’ (1969) 1(2) 
Auckland University Law Review 29, 32–7. 
 86 See, eg, Lukacs v Wood (1978) 19 SASR 520; Oh Hiam v Tham Kong (1980) 2 BPR 9 451; 
Minister for Education and Training v Canham (2004) NSW ConvR ¶56-080. See also Lynden 
Griggs, ‘Indefeasibility and Mistake — The Utilitarianism of Torrens’ (2003) 10 Australian 
Property Law Journal 108. 
 87 Horvath v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [1999] 1 VR 643. 
 88 For judicial suggestions that indefeasibility prevails over a plea of non est factum, see Grosvenor 
Mortgage Management Pty Ltd v Younan Permanent Trustee Australia Ltd (Unreported, Su-
preme Court of New South Wales, Young J, 23 August 1990); PT Ltd v Maradona Pty Ltd 
(1992) 25 NSWLR 643, 675–83 (Giles J). Cf Perpetual Trustees Victoria Ltd v Ford [2008] 
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principle, it is suggested that non est factum cannot defeat a registered proprie-
tor’s indefeasible title. Otherwise, this will introduce an indefensible distinction 
between the Frazer v Walker situation and a case where non est factum is 
alleged. It would be strange to say that the previous registered proprietor may 
lose their land due to a third party’s forgery which caused the land to be regis-
tered in another’s name, but is able to stave off a claim where their own act 
(albeit one vitiated by non est factum) was the causative event which led to the 
later registration. It also follows that where there is no contract between the 
plaintiff and the defendant — for example, where the defendant becomes the 
registered proprietor as a result of a forgery by a third party rogue — a restitu-
tionary claim based on mistake or failure of consideration cannot be brought 
against the defendant. This is because such a restitutionary claim will undermine, 
in substance, the principle of immediate indefeasibility conferred on a registered 
proprietor. This latter point is developed below in Part VII, which discusses 
restitutionary claims. 
IV  CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST 
One of the most difficult issues in Torrens jurisprudence that remains unre-
solved is whether a prayer for a declaration of a constructive trust may be 
brought against the registered proprietor as part of the in personam exception. As 
with any discussion on the constructive trust, it is important to be clear from the 
outset about the terminology used in order to avoid unnecessary confusion.89 The 
term ‘constructive trust’ can be utilised in two ways. Used in a proprietary sense, 
the defendant is declared constructively by the court to be the trustee of the 
property for the defendant — the constructive trust has a proprietary significance 
since the defendant is actually ordered to hold property for the benefit of the 
claimant. In contrast, the term ‘constructive trust’ has sometimes been used to 
describe a form of relief which is personal in nature. An example of this is when 
the defendant is ordered to be liable to account as a constructive trustee. When 
the term constructive trust is used in this second sense, the remedy is personal in 
nature.90 Such liability to account as a constructive trustee might arise when the 
defendant is guilty of an equitable wrong, for example: (1) where the defendant 
intermeddles and voluntarily assumes the mantle of trusteeship;91 and (2) where 
the defendant dishonestly assists in a breach of trust.92 Such personal claims are 
part of the in personam exception. If the registered proprietor was personally 
guilty of wrongdoing, it is hard to see why the principle of indefeasibility should 
protect them from such wrongdoing. 
 
NSWSC 29 (Unreported, Harrison J, 1 February 2008) [61]–[84], [109], where it was held that 
the indefeasible interest was avoided by reason of non est factum. 
 89 See Lionel Smith, ‘Constructive Trusts and Constructive Trustees’ (1999) 58 Cambridge Law 
Journal 294; Tang, ‘Confidence and the Constructive Trust’, above n 37, 137–8. See also Law-
book Company, Principles of the Law of Trusts, vol 2 (at 47) [22 000]. Bryan is responsible for 
the chapter on constructive trusts in Principles of the Law of Trusts: at ch 22. 
 90 See Dubai Aluminium Co Ltd v Salaam [2003] 2 AC 366, 404–5 (Lord Millett); Paragon 
Finance plc v D B Thakerar & Co (a firm) [1999] 1 All ER 400, 408–10 (Millett LJ). 
 91 For an overview of the law in this area, see Lawbook Company, above n 89, [22 910]. 
 92 Ibid [22 680]–[22 710]. 
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The rest of this Part considers constructive trust claims used in the proprietary 
sense. Proprietary claims are more difficult to analyse because they do prima 
facie undermine the principle of indefeasibility — a successful prosecution of 
these claims will result in the registered proprietor being declared as the trustee 
for the plaintiff. As such, constructive trust claims directly affect the title of the 
registered proprietor. However, as argued above in Part III, it is erroneous to 
assume that no claims which attract proprietary relief can be brought against the 
registered proprietor because it is necessarily inconsistent with the principle of 
indefeasibility. 
The difficulty with analysing constructive trust claims is compounded by the 
fact that such claims may arise in a myriad of circumstances. Bryan perceptively 
notes that whether a claim for a constructive trust falls within the in personam 
exception depends on the nature of the claim.93 According to Bryan, the declara-
tion of a constructive trust ‘must not be a claim which would subvert the 
principle of indefeasibility of title’.94 Bryan correctly asserts that a constructive 
trust will not be declared over Torrens land simply because the defendant became 
the registered proprietor with constructive notice of a breach of fiduciary duty.95 
This analysis is entirely consistent with Torrens philosophy. The importation of 
the doctrine of constructive notice to Torrens land would severely undermine the 
principle of indefeasibility. 
A related question to Bryan’s observation is this: how should a constructive 
trust claim premised on a vindication of equitable title be analysed within the 
Torrens framework?96 A constructive trust claim based on the assertion of an 
equitable title might arise in the following context.97 Let us first assume that the 
original registered proprietor holds the land on an express trust for the plaintiff 
beneficiary. In breach of trust, the registered proprietor transfers the property to 
the defendant, who is a volunteer. A variation to this factual scenario might 
involve the tracing process. Let us now suppose a rogue trustee in breach of trust 
withdraws money from a trust account and purchases registered land. The rogue 
trustee then transfers the land to the defendant who is a volunteer. Can the 
plaintiff beneficiary in these two scenarios ask the court to declare that the 
defendant holds the property as a constructive trustee for the plaintiff? The 
answer to this question would depend on a careful examination of the indefeasi-
bility provisions of the jurisdiction in which the claim is brought. In jurisdictions 
where indefeasibility of title is conferred only on purchasers of registered land 
and not volunteers,98 the plaintiff would be entitled to bring a constructive claim 
against the defendant. There is no conflict between the principle of indefeasibil-
 
 93 See ibid [22 975]. 
 94 Ibid. 
 95 Ibid. 
 96 On vindication of equitable title, see, eg, Foskett v McKeown [2001] 1 AC 102. For a discussion 
of this case, see Tang Hang Wu, ‘Foskett v McKeown — Hard-Nosed Property Rights or Unjust 
Enrichment?’ (2001) 25 Melbourne University Law Review 295. 
 97 See Bryan, ‘Recipient Liability under the Torrens System’, above n 42, 86–8. 
 98 For an overview of the issue of indefeasibility and volunteers, see Butt, Land Law, above n 7, 
798–9; Adrian J Bradbrook, Susan V MacCallum and Anthony P Moore, Australian Real Prop-
erty Law (4th ed, 2007) 160–1. 
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ity and a constructive trust claim since the defendant is not entitled to indefeasi-
ble title because they are a volunteer. However, in jurisdictions where a regis-
tered proprietor is granted indefeasible title even if they are a volunteer, a 
constructive trust claim should be precluded because it is inconsistent with the 
principle of indefeasibility.99 A title-based claim (albeit one premised in equity) 
is incompatible with the Torrens jurisprudence of immediate indefeasibility. 
What then are constructive trust claims which do not undermine the principle 
of indefeasibility? It is suggested that constructive trust claims which arise from 
the wrongful conduct of the registered proprietor fall within the in personam 
exception.100 However, the registered proprietor’s conduct must amount to 
something more than merely becoming the new registered proprietor with notice 
of a prior unregistered interest. A simple illustration may be used to demonstrate 
this point. Suppose X is the registered proprietor of Greenacre. X makes certain 
representations to Y and, what is more, Y relies on these statements to Y’s 
detriment. Let us assume that a court has adjudicated that the best way to satisfy 
Y’s equity which arises from a claim for proprietary estoppel against X is to 
declare a constructive trust whereby X holds Greenacre on trust for Y. Does X, as 
the registered proprietor, have a defence of indefeasibility of title to a declaration 
of a constructive trust in this context? The answer is no. Indefeasibility of title 
does not provide X with the immunity to engage in unconscionable conduct 
vis-a-vis Y which would amount to a valid proprietary estoppel claim. It is 
therefore suggested that the following constructive trust claims are legitimately 
within the in personam exception to indefeasibility: 
1 where a person acquires property in breach of fiduciary duty; 
2 where an equity arises from proprietary estoppel stemming from the conduct 
of the registered proprietor; 
3 where the registered proprietor enters into a specifically enforceable contract 
to dispose of the land and attempts to renege on the agreement; 
4 where the registered proprietor evinces a ‘common intention’ to share the 
property in informal property arrangements and the plaintiff has relied on this 
common intention to their detriment; and 
5 where the registered proprietor buys the property using bribes.101 
There is the outstanding issue of the problem vis-a-vis Torrens land and the 
constructive trust posed by a certain factual pattern which always recurs in land 
law cases.102 The recurring factual pattern can be summarised as follows: Y has 
rights in land belonging to R1; R1 transfers the land to R2; R2 knows of Y’s 
rights and buys the land at a lower value. In some cases, R2 also expressly agrees 
to honour Y’s rights. Is Y entitled to ask the court to declare that R2 holds the 
 
 99 Lawbook Company, above n 89, [22 760]. 
100 See Moore, ‘Equity, Restitution and In Personam Claims under the Torrens System’ (Pt 1), 
above n 74, 265. 
101 For a comprehensive account of the law in these areas, see generally Lawbook Company, 
above n 89, ch 22. 
102 See, eg, Bahr (1988) 164 CLR 604; Lyus v Prowsa Developments Ltd [1982] 2 All ER 953; 
Binions v Evans [1972] Ch 359; Ho Kon Kim v Lim Gek Kim Betsy [2001] 4 SLR 340. 
     
2008] A Framework of the In Personam Exception to Indefeasibility 687 
     
property on constructive trust for Y? Furthermore, is such a declaration of a 
constructive trust precluded by R2’s assertion of indefeasibility as the registered 
proprietor? There appear to be a few possible solutions to these questions. A 
majority of the High Court of Australia in Bahr v Nicolay [No 2] (‘Bahr’) 
declared a constructive trust on these facts.103 As opposed to the analysis of the 
majority in Bahr, there are academic commentaries104 and case law105 which 
suggest that a declaration of a constructive trust analysis is not the most appro-
priate analysis on these facts. The argument is that liability on R2 could either be 
imposed via: (1) a finding of fraud on R2’s part;106 (2) a finding of an express 
trust where R2 holds the property on trust for Y;107 (3) a finding of tortious 
liability on R2’s part — namely, the tort of conspiracy;108 or (4) a contractual 
liability on R2’s part to honour their obligation to Y.109 It is beyond the scope of 
this article to examine which of these approaches is preferable as a route to 
impose some sort of legal liability on R2. For the purposes of this article, it is 
sufficient to point out that, despite disagreement on whether a constructive trust 
ought to be declared in this factual pattern, there seems to be unanimity both in 
the case law and academic commentaries that R2 should take subject to Y’s 
interest. As such, R2 cannot assert indefeasibility of title to defeat Y’s claim. Y’s 
in personam claim could either be rationalised on a constructive trust basis, an 
express trust, a tort claim or a contractual claim. 
V  KNOWING RECEIPT 
There is uncertainty as to whether a claim in knowing receipt110 may be main-
tained against a registered proprietor.111 Before discussing in detail the contro-
versy in this area, it is helpful to sketch out how a claim for knowing receipt 
might arise in the Torrens context. A rogue forges registration documents and 
causes trust property to be transferred to the defendant. Let us assume that the 
particular Torrens jurisdiction confers indefeasibility of title to the defendant in 
this case.112 Is indefeasibility an absolute bar to a knowing receipt claim in this 
context? 
 
103 (1988) 164 CLR 604, 638–8 (Wilson and Toohey JJ), 654–6 (Brennan J). 
104 See, eg, Susan Bright, ‘The Third Party’s Conscience in Land Law’ [2000] Conveyancer and 
Property Lawyer 398; Crown, ‘Equity Trumps the Torrens System’, above n 14. 
105 See, eg, Bebe [2006] 4 SLR 884, 913, where Chan Sek Keong CJ, in a judgment for the 
Singapore Court of Appeal, preferred to analyse the facts as Torrens fraud. 
106 Ibid. 
107 Ibid. See also Bahr (1988) 164 CLR 604, 618–19 (Mason CJ and Dawson J). 
108 Bright, above n 104, 408–13. 
109 Ibid 413–18; Crown, ‘Equity Trumps the Torrens System’, above n 14. 
110 This is sometimes known as the first limb of liability under Barnes v Addy (1874) LR 9 Ch App 
244. 
111 For a discussion of this issue in recent articles, see Moses, above n 71; Bryan, ‘Recipient 
Liability under the Torrens System’, above n 42; Harding, above n 1. 
112 There could be two explanations for this. First, the facts could occur in a Torrens jurisdiction 
which confers indefeasibility of title to all registered proprietors including volunteers. Secondly, 
the defendant could be a purchaser. 
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A  The Authorities 
The authorities have not spoken with one voice on this issue. Macquarie Bank 
Ltd v Sixty-Fourth Throne Pty Ltd (‘Sixty-Fourth Throne’)113 is frequently cited 
as the main authority for the proposition that a knowing receipt claim is inconsis-
tent with Torrens land.114 This case involved the appellant bank extending a loan 
to a rogue on, inter alia, a security by way of a mortgage over property owned by 
the respondent company. The appellant duly registered the mortgage. It turned 
out that the rogue had forged the instrument of mortgage. One of the respon-
dent’s arguments was that the appellant was subject to the in personam exception 
for liability under knowing receipt. Tadgell JA, with Winneke P concurring115 
and Ashley AJA dissenting,116 took the position that a defendant is not regarded 
as receiving trust property by registering a mortgage over Torrens land.117 
Tadgell JA reasoned that since Torrens land operates by way of a system of title 
by registration, a registered proprietor obtains title over the land from the act of 
registration of the land and not from the act of receipt from the rogue.118 As such, 
the element of receipt of trust property can never be made out in respect of 
Torrens land. Tadgell JA also thought that to allow a claim for knowing receipt 
would amount to a ‘back door’ attack on the principle of indefeasibility.119  
In contrast, Hansen J in Koorootang Nominees Pty Ltd v Australia and New 
Zealand Banking Group Ltd (‘Koorootang’) did not seem to have any problems 
with applying a knowing receipt analysis to Torrens land.120 However, the 
authority of this case is weakened by the fact that the defendant did not seek to 
argue that the concept of immediate indefeasibility rendered it immune from a 
knowing receipt claim.121 The Court in Tara Shire Council v Garner (‘Tara 
Shire’)  also saw no contradiction between Torrens land and knowing receipt.122 
Atkinson J rejected the argument that the principle of indefeasibility precluded a 
claim for knowing receipt.123 The learned judge held that the Torrens statute 
‘was not intended to protect a registered proprietor who had gained title by 
knowingly participating in a breach of trust.’124 
It was in this state of conflicting authorities that the High Court of Australia 
decided Farah Constructions Pty Ltd v Say-Dee Pty Ltd (‘Farah Construc-
 
113 [1998] 3 VR 133. 
114 See, eg, Butt, Land Law, above n 7, 791–2. 
115 Sixty-Fourth Throne [1998] 3 VR 133, 136. 
116 Ibid 166–7. 
117 Ibid 156–7. This case was cited with approval by LHK Nominees [2002] 26 WAR 517, 549 
(Murray J), 555 (Anderson and Steytler JJ), 568–72 (Pullin J). 
118 Sixty-Fourth Throne [1998] 3 VR 133, 156–7. See also Disctronics Ltd v Edmonds [2002] VSC 
454 (Unreported, Warren J, 23 October 2003). 
119 Sixty-Fourth Throne [1998] 3 VR 133, 157. See also White v Tomasel [2004] 2 Qd R 438. 
120 [1998] 3 VR 16, 74–5, 105. 
121 Ibid 75 (Hansen J). 
122 [2003] 1 Qd R 556. For a discussion and critique of this case, see Peter Butt, ‘Indefeasibility and 
“Knowing Receipt” of Trust Property’ (2002) 76 Australian Law Journal 606; Griggs, ‘The 
Tectonic Plate of Equity’, above n 13. 
123 Tara Shire [2003] 1 Qd R 556, 582–5. 
124 Ibid 585. 
     
2008] A Framework of the In Personam Exception to Indefeasibility 689 
     
tions’).125 In their Honours’ unanimous joint judgment, Gleeson CJ, Gummow, 
Callinan, Heydon and Crennan JJ extensively quoted Tadgell JA’s judgment in 
Sixty-Fourth Throne with apparent approval.126 The learned judges also opined 
that the lower court in Farah Constructions should have referred127 to the case of 
LHK Nominees Pty Ltd v Kenworthy (‘LHK Nominees’).128 The High Court then 
tersely said the lower court ‘ought to have followed’ Sixty-Fourth Throne and 
LHK Nominees.129 Professor Peter Butt interprets this decision as settling the 
issue once and for all. According to Butt, ‘the position now seems settled [that] 
conduct caught by the first limb of Barnes v Addy does not cause a registered 
title to be set aside on a right in personam basis’.130 
B  Arguments from Principle 
There are two potential conceptual obstacles to a knowing receipt claim. First, 
there is some dispute as to whether a defendant actually receives trust property 
when they become a registered proprietor of the land. Secondly, even if the first 
threshold issue can be overcome, there is this background question: is a claim for 
knowing receipt substantively inconsistent with the principle of indefeasibility? 
On the first issue, Tadgell JA in Sixty-Fourth Throne took the position that 
proprietary rights under the Torrens system derive from the fact of registration 
and not from an event antecedent to it.131 If this is taken to be a general principle, 
the element of receipt can never be made out in the context of Torrens land. With 
respect, this analysis is unconvincing as a general principle because it is unduly 
technical. Take an example of a rogue who forges registration documents and 
transfers land which is subject to a trust to the defendant. In this scenario, is it 
really realistic to say that the defendant had not received the trust property but 
has independently gained title by the act of registration? The registration of title 
by the defendant in this case is not an independent act completely divorced from 
the actions of the rogue. It is more accurate to characterise the transfer of the 
land as being facilitated by the actions of the rogue which had the effect of 
destroying the beneficiaries’ rights to the land. Therefore, it is not too much of a 
stretch to argue that the defendant had in fact received trust property in this 
context. Alternatively, one can say that it is possible for the beneficiaries to use 
the tracing process to establish that the defendant had received trust property. 
The beneficiaries ought to be able to trace the value inherent in the land to the 
land now registered in the defendant’s name. 
 
125 (2007) 230 CLR 89. For a discussion of this case, see David Hayton, ‘Lessons from Knowing 
Receipt Liability and Unjust Enrichment in Australia’ (2007) 21 Trust Law International 55; 
Pauline Ridge and Joachim Dietrich, ‘Equitable Third Party Liability’ (2008) 124 Law Quarterly 
Review 26. 
126 Farah Constructions (2007) 230 CLR 89, 169–70. 
127 Ibid 171. 
128 [2002] 26 WAR 517. 
129 Farah Constructions (2007) 230 CLR 89, 171 (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Callinan, Heydon and 
Crennan JJ). 
130 Peter Butt, ‘“Knowing Receipt of Trust Property” as an Exception to Indefeasibility’ (2007) 81 
Australian Law Journal 713, 714. 
131 [1998] 3 VR 133, 156–7. 
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Although I argue that the element of receipt of trust property can be made out, 
a claim for knowing receipt ought to be precluded in the context of registered 
land as it is in substance incompatible with the principle of indefeasibility.132 
Before developing this argument, it is necessary to briefly outline the jurispru-
dential basis of knowing receipt. Knowing receipt is difficult to analyse because 
there are several contested theoretical models which purport to explain this cause 
of action.133 These models include the following: 
1 Knowing receipt is an equitable wrong.134 Actual or constructive knowledge 
by the recipient of the breach of trust is sufficient to impose liability on the 
recipient.135 
2 Knowing receipt is premised on the concept of unconscionability. Nourse LJ 
in Bank of Credit and Commerce International (Overseas) Ltd v Akindele 
said that ‘[a]ll that is necessary is that the recipient’s state of knowledge 
should be such as to make it unconscionable for him to retain the benefit of 
the receipt’.136 
3 Knowing receipt is premised upon the principle of unjust enrichment. ‘It 
would be confined to restoring an unjust gain. Change of position would be 
available as a defence accordingly’.137 
4 Knowing receipt is better viewed as equity’s cousin to the common law 
action of conversion. In other words, it is a response to interference with the 
plaintiff’s equitable title.138 However, since an equitable title is always sus-
ceptible to being defeated by a bona fide purchaser for value without notice, 
some degree of knowledge must be present before liability attaches. 
It is beyond the scope of this article to try to resolve the longstanding issue as 
to which of these approaches is preferable. The thesis of this article is that an 
action in knowing receipt is in substance inconsistent with the principle of 
 
132 Cf Bryan, ‘Recipient Liability under the Torrens System’, above n 42, 97–8, where it is argued 
that a personal claim for knowing receipt ought to be technically available for Torrens land. 
133 See, eg, Michael Bryan, ‘The Liability of the Recipient: Restitution at Common Law or 
Wrongdoing in Equity’ in Simone Degeling and James Edelman (eds), Equity and Commercial 
Law (2005) 327. 
134 See, eg, Moses, above n 71, 141. 
135 Consul Development Pty Ltd v DPC Estates Pty Ltd (1975) 132 CLR 373, cited with approval in 
Farah Constructions (2007) 230 CLR 89. 
136 [2001] Ch D 437, 455. Cf Criterion Properties plc v Stratford UK Properties LLC [2004] 1 
WLR 1846 (Lord Nicholls). 
137 Lord Nicholls, ‘Knowing Receipt: The Need for a New Landmark’ in W R Cornish et al (eds), 
Restitution: Past, Present and Future — Essays in Honour of Gareth Jones (1998) 231. See also 
Koorootang [1998] 3 VR 16, 78–105 (Hansen J); Farah Constructions Pty Ltd v Say-Dee Pty 
Ltd [2004] NSWSC 800 (Unreported, Palmer J, 19 August 2004); James Edelman, ‘A Principled 
Approach to Unauthorised Receipt of Trust Property’ (2006) 122 Law Quarterly Review 174. 
The unjust enrichment analysis was rejected in Farah Constructions (2007) 230 CLR 89,  
148–59 (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Callinan, Heydon and Crennan JJ). See also Brad Strahorn, 
‘The End of Knowing Receipt? A Riposte to Unjust Enrichment’ (2006) 80 Australian Law 
Journal 765. 
138 See Lionel Smith, ‘W(h)ither Knowing Receipt?’ (1998) 114 Law Quarterly Review 394; Ross 
Grantham and Charles E Rickett, Enrichment and Restitution in New Zealand (2000) 281–2. See 
also Lionel Smith, ‘Unjust Enrichment, Property and the Structure of Trusts’ (2000) 116 Law 
Quarterly Review 412. 
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indefeasibility on any of these contested approaches. Take the first two formula-
tions of the liability in knowing receipt. The principal elements of the action 
would be: (1) receipt of trust property for one’s own use; and (2) the requisite 
knowledge on the recipient’s part which would make the receipt wrongful or 
unconscionable. In other words, liability is imposed on the registered proprietor 
primarily on the basis of the state of the registered proprietor’s knowledge of a 
prior unregistered interest (the trust or fiduciary obligation owing to the plaintiff) 
at the time of registration. The action of knowing receipt appears to be in direct 
conflict with the Torrens philosophy of absolving the registered proprietor from 
legal liability on the basis of notice of an unregistered interest. As Mary-Anne 
Hughson, Marcia Neave and Pamela O’Connor observe: ‘any claim based 
wholly or substantially on general law doctrines of notice would conflict with 
the clear legislative intent expressed in the “notice” provisions.’139 There are two 
counter-arguments against the thesis that knowing receipt is in substance 
inconsistent with the principle of indefeasibility. First, knowing receipt is merely 
a personal claim and not a proprietary claim. As such, it could be argued that a 
successful claim in knowing receipt does not affect the title of the registered 
proprietor.140 Secondly, an argument could be made that Torrens statutes do not 
protect the registered proprietor from actions where notice of an unregistered 
interest is one of the elements of the cause of action. On reflection, both argu-
ments are not convincing answers to the charge that an action in knowing receipt 
is in substance inconsistent with the principle of indefeasibility. Although an 
action in knowing receipt is merely personal in nature, one can legitimately say 
that such a claim, if allowed, constitutes a back door attack on the principle of 
indefeasibility because it erodes one of the fundamental characteristics of 
Torrens land — that is, knowledge of a prior interest does not import legal 
liability. Furthermore, it is a hollow victory for the registered proprietor to retain 
the land if they have to pay a sum equivalent to the value of the land in terms of 
equitable compensation to the defendant. The argument that Torrens statutes do 
not make a registered proprietor immune from claims where one of the elements 
of the cause of action is notice of an unregistered interest is also not apposite 
with regard to an action in knowing receipt. In the case of knowing receipt, the 
primary basis for liability is dependent on the state of the knowledge of recipi-
ent. 
A knowing receipt claim is also inconsistent with Torrens philosophy even if 
one subscribes to the unjust enrichment analysis. To establish an unjust enrich-
ment claim, one has to identify the ‘unjust factor’ — the ground of restitution in 
a particular case.141 The most plausible unjust factor in this context is the 
ignorance of the plaintiff that the land was transferred to the defendant.142 A 
moment’s reflection will reveal that an unjust enrichment claim where the unjust 
factor is ignorance does not ‘fit’ within the Torrens scheme. This is because such 
 
139 See Hughson, Neave and O’Connor, above n 1, 494. 
140 This argument has been made by Harding, above n 1, 352–5. 
141 See, eg, Banque Financière de la Cité v Parc (Battersea) Ltd [1999] 1 AC 221, 227 (Lord 
Steyn). 
142 On this unjust factor, see Andrew Burrows, The Law of Restitution (2nd ed, 2002) 182–210. 
Cf Graham Virgo, The Principles of the Law of Restitution (2nd ed, 2006) 131–6. 
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an unjust enrichment claim would technically be open to the original registered 
proprietor in the classic Frazer v Walker situation where the defendant becomes 
the new registered proprietor via forged documents.143 Such a position is 
untenable because it goes against the theory of immediate indefeasibility that a 
registered proprietor obtains indefeasible title once they register their interest.144 
Likewise, the rationalisation that knowing receipt is better seen as a response to 
the interference with the plaintiff’s equitable title is also inconsistent with the 
principle of indefeasibility of title. Under the Torrens system, once a person 
becomes a registered proprietor, they obtain indefeasible title and should be 
immune to any attack based on a third party’s equitable title. 
The argument above assumes that the action by the plaintiff is brought when 
the defendant still retains the property. Would it make a difference if the defen-
dant had already disposed of their interest in the land? Is there an argument to be 
made that, once the defendant sells the land, an action in knowing receipt is not 
incompatible with the principle of indefeasibility? On balance, it is suggested 
that a knowing receipt claim ought not to be allowed even after the defendant 
sells the property. Otherwise, there will be an indefensible distinction between a 
situation where the defendant retains the land and a situation where the defen-
dant sells the land: surely, it is a matter of fortuitous coincidence as to when the 
cause of action is brought against the defendant. In any case, the defendant may 
simply wait until the cause of action is time-barred before selling the land in 
order to defeat the plaintiff’s claim. There does not seem to be any reason why 
the law should force the defendant to retain the land until the expiry of the 
limitation period in this situation. 
Before leaving this Part, the issue of dishonest assistance and its relationship 
with knowing receipt should be addressed. Professor Charles Mitchell points out 
that it is possible for a defendant to be liable for dishonest assistance where they 
have received trust property.145 Mitchell observes that in practice most plaintiffs 
do not sue for dishonest assistance because: (1) the plaintiff usually prefers to 
assert a proprietary claim based on a vindication of equitable title if the property 
is still in the defendant’s hands;146 and (2) knowing receipt requires a lesser 
degree of fault than dishonesty.147 However, if the argument made in this Part is 
accepted — that is, a claim in knowing receipt is precluded in the context of 
Torrens land — then a plaintiff may wish to bring a claim against the defendant 
in dishonest assistance instead. There is no problem in fitting a dishonest 
assistance claim within the Torrens system because the defendant’s conduct can 
easily be characterised as Torrens fraud.148 
 
143 The defence of change of position in good faith might, however, be open if the defendant had 
paid the rogue trustee for the purchase of the land. 
144 See Frazer v Walker [1967] 1 AC 569; Garofano (1992) NSW ConvR ¶55-640; Vassos [1993] 2 
VR 316. 
145 Charles Mitchell, ‘Assistance’ in Peter Birks and Arianna Pretto (eds), Breach of Trust (2002) 
139, 182–7. See, eg, Equiticorp Industries Group Ltd (in stat mgmt) v The Crown [No 47] 
[1998] 2 NZLR 481, 539, 641 (Smellie J). 
146 Mitchell, above n 145, 182. 
147 Ibid 182–3. 
148 LHK Nominees [2002] 26 WAR 517; Butt, Land Law, above n 7, 791–2. 
     
2008] A Framework of the In Personam Exception to Indefeasibility 693 
     
VI  UNDUE INFLUENCE,  UNCONSCIONABLE CONDUCT AND DURESS 
If a person becomes a registered proprietor by exercising undue influence over 
the previous registered proprietor, then the indefeasibility provisions should not 
be a bar to setting the transaction aside. The previous registered proprietor 
should be able to vitiate the transfer of land if they can demonstrate a case of 
actionable undue influence. Adrian Bradbrook, Susan MacCallum and Anthony 
Moore observe that: ‘Where the transaction concerns Torrens land, and the 
person relying on the instrument is responsible for or involved in the vitiating 
factor, the in personam exception … may be used to defeat the title of the 
registered proprietor.’149 Setting aside the transaction in this case does not 
threaten the Torrens policy of maintaining the integrity of the register. As argued 
above,150 the concept of indefeasibility in Torrens land merely protects the title 
of the registered proprietor from an unregistered interest; it does not provide the 
registered proprietor with a cloak of immunity to engage in wrongful conduct 
such as exercising undue influence over another individual. 
Matters become more complicated when the plaintiff attempts to set aside the 
transaction based on a factual pattern as presented in Garcia.151 In Garcia-like 
cases, the plaintiff is usually the wife who is seeking to set aside a guarantee 
secured on the property which is given to a bank for her husband’s debt. Under 
the Garcia doctrine, the wife may set aside the guarantee if: (1) she did not have 
an understanding of the effect of the transaction; (2) she was a volunteer — that 
is, she did not benefit from guaranteeing her husband’s debts; (3) the bank knew 
of the husband and wife relationship; and (4) the bank did not explain the 
transaction to the wife or ensure that the wife received independent legal 
advice.152 The unresolved question is this: how does the Garcia doctrine ‘fit’ in 
with Torrens jurisprudence? Why is the bank as a registered mortgagee not 
entitled to defeat the claim by asserting indefeasibility of title in this case? 
There appear to be two conflicting views on whether the Garcia doctrine may 
be analysed as an in personam exception to indefeasibility. In Sixty-Fourth 
Throne, Tadgell JA, with whom Winneke P concurred, rejected an argument to 
set aside the mortgage on a plea based on the English decision of Barclays Bank 
plc v O’Brien (‘O’Brien’).153 Tadgell JA rationalised the O’Brien doctrine as 
being premised on constructive notice. His Honour said quite pointedly that the 
doctrine of constructive notice ‘would, in effect, introduce into the scheme of 
title by registration the notion of priority determinable by reference to the 
doctrine of the bona fide purchaser for value without notice, a doctrine at odds 
with the Torrens system.’154 As such, Tadgell JA held that the plaintiff could not 
 
149 Bradbrook, MacCallum and Moore, above n 98, 171. 
150 See above Part IV. 
151 (1998) 194 CLR 395. See generally Tyler, Young and Croft, above n 83, 347–52; Phang and 
Tjio, above n 83. 
152 (1998) 194 CLR 395, 409 (Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ). 
153 Sixty-Fourth Throne [1998] 3 VR 133, 146–54, referring to Barclays Bank plc v O’Brien [1994] 
1 AC 180. Winneke P agreed in Sixty-Fourth Throne: at 136–7. 
154 Sixty-Fourth Throne [1998] 3 VR 133, 152. Cf Griggs, ‘In Personam, Garcia v NAB and the 
Torrens System’, above n 15, 87, where it is argued that ‘[a]ny analysis of a case involving 
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raise a claim in personam to impeach the defendant’s title as the registered 
mortgagee.155 In contrast, Ashley AJA did not rule out the application of the 
O’Brien doctrine to Torrens land.156 Although declining to hold that O’Brien 
applied in the present case,157 Ashley AJA said that his Honour preferred ‘a 
conclusion that the protection of sureties which equity affords in such a case 
ought not be denied by the indefeasibility principle.’158 
It might be argued that there is a distinction between the English doctrine of 
O’Brien and the Australian counterpart in Garcia. The distinction can be 
couched as follows: under the English doctrine of undue influence the mortgage 
is set aside due to the constructive notice on the bank’s part,159 whereas under 
Australian law the ground for setting aside the transaction is premised on the 
unconscionable conduct of the bank. Hence, it is conceptually unobjectionable as 
a matter of ‘fit’ to apply the Garcia doctrine to Torrens land because Garcia does 
not utilise the notion of constructive notice. Instead, Garcia focuses directly on 
the unconscionable behaviour of the registered mortgagee. This distinction is too 
slender to be defensible. At the end of the day, in most situations, the result 
would be exactly the same whether we apply O’Brien or Garcia. If we accept the 
argument that there is usually no substantive difference between O’Brien and 
Garcia, we are still left with this question: which approach (Tadgell JA’s 
approach160 or Ashley AJA’s analysis161 in Sixty-Fourth Throne) is preferable? 
Ultimately, the answer boils down to a matter of policy. It cannot be denied that 
the Garcia doctrine does in practice affect the principle of indefeasibility. If the 
Garcia doctrine is applicable to Torrens land, a bank obtaining a mortgage 
cannot simply register its mortgage and assert indefeasibility of title. The bank 
will have to take certain steps to ensure that the wife receives independent legal 
advice. Thus, Garcia can be seen as a policy-motivated decision where the onus 
is placed on the bank as a gatekeeper to prevent undue influence or unconscion-
able conduct being perpetrated on the wife by the husband. This policy — the 
bank as a gatekeeper in preventing undue influence or unconscionable conduct 
— conflicts with the principle of conferring immediate indefeasibility on a 
registered proprietor. As such, the courts will have to make a decision as to 
which policy prevails. It is the present writer’s view that the Garcia doctrine 
should not be construed as being incompatible with Torrens land because the 
social utility of the doctrine — the protection of vulnerable people in a familial 
situation — far outweighs the principle of indefeasibility of title.162 
 
Torrens land should start from the fundamental precepts of indefeasibility of title and the irrele-
vancy of notice — if these are to be waived, the justification for this action must be established.’ 
155 Sixty-Fourth Throne [1998] 3 VR 133, 152–4. 
156 Ibid 173. 
157 Ibid. 
158 Ibid. 
159 O’Brien [1994] 1 AC 180, 195–9 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson). Cf the current reformulation of the 
English law of undue influence that treats these cases as ‘a class of contracts which has special 
features of its own’: Etridge [2002] 2 AC 773, 803 (Lord Nicholls). 
160 Sixty-Fourth Throne [1998] 3 VR 133, 156–7. 
161 Ibid 166–7. 
162 For a recent attempt to rationalise this doctrine, see Mindy Chen-Wishart, ‘Undue Influence: 
Vindicating Relationships of Influence’ (2006) 59 Current Legal Problems 231. 
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The issue regarding unconscionable dealings163 and duress is easier to analyse. 
In the former case, if the registered proprietor dealt with the plaintiff who was 
under a special disability and the disability was sufficiently evident to the 
registered proprietor, making the transaction prima facie unfair or unconscien-
tious, then the plaintiff should be able maintain a personal action against the 
registered proprietor to set aside the transfer of the land. A similar conclusion can 
be reached in respect of duress. If the registered proprietor exercised actionable 
duress on the plaintiff, then the plaintiff should be able to set aside the transac-
tion. 
VII   RESTITUTIONARY CLAIMS BASED ON MISTAKE,  FAILURE OF  
BASIS  AND IGNORANCE 
Certain restitutionary claims cannot be maintained against the registered 
proprietor because these claims will place an intolerable strain on the principle of 
indefeasibility. Restitutionary claims based on mistake, failure of consideration 
and ignorance are such examples, especially in the context of three-party 
situations.164 Otherwise, a restitutionary claim might be open against the 
registered proprietor in the following circumstance: A is the original registered 
proprietor; B, a rogue, forges A’s signature and transfers the property to C; C 
registers the transfer of property. Under traditional Torrens jurisprudence, C 
obtains indefeasible title.165 However, if such restitutionary claims are part of the 
in personam exception, A can bring a personal action against C on the ground 
that: (1) A was mistaken vis-a-vis the transfer of property; (2) there was no basis 
for the transfer of property — that is, failure of consideration; or (3) A was 
ignorant of the transfer of the property to C. This represents a back door attack 
on the central tenet of the principle of indefeasibility. While it is true that C 
might be able to stave off a restitutionary challenge by pleading the change of 
position defence if C had paid value for the property, the better approach is to 
exclude these claims on the ground that it is inconsistent with the idea of 
indefeasibility of title.  
There are also a few reasons why it is better to preclude a restitutionary claim 
as a matter of policy rather than leaving it to the change of position defence to 
absolve the plaintiff from liability. First, the change of position defence depends 
on C providing value for the property. However, in certain Torrens jurisdictions, 
indefeasibility of title is conferred on volunteers.166 Hence, the argument that 
change of position will always exclude restitutionary liability breaks down in 
those jurisdictions. Secondly, the change of position may not work in every 
 
163 The reference to unconscionable dealings is to established categories such as the case of 
Commercial Bank of Australia v Amadio (1983) 151 CLR 447. As argued above in this Part, 
vague assertions of unconscionability on the registered proprietor’s part should not be part of the 
in personam exception. 
164 See Chambers, ‘Indefeasible Title as a Bar to a Claim for Restitution’, above n 25, 130. For 
support of this argument, see Moore, ‘Equity, Restitution and In Personam Claims under the 
Torrens System’ (Pt 2), above n 25; Edelman and Bant, above n 25, 352–5. 
165 See Frazer v Walker [1967] 1 AC 569; Garofano (1992) NSW ConvR ¶55–640; Vassos [1993] 2 
VR 316. 
166 See above n 98. 
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situation. One of the fundamental elements of the defence is that the change of 
position must be made in good faith.167 There will inevitably be the temptation to 
analyse good faith based on whether C had knowledge of the fraud or forgery.168 
Such an analysis would be sailing too close to the wind of actual or constructive 
notice which is an anathema to Torrens jurisprudence. 
However, it should be pointed out that a claim against a registered proprietor 
based on mistake or failure of consideration is possible in certain circumstances, 
especially in two-party cases. Suppose A transfers registered land to B pursuant 
to a contract. The contract is then found to be vitiated by reason of a mistake or 
failure of consideration. In these circumstances, A should be able to set aside the 
transfer of the property or to ask for restitution of the value of the land trans-
ferred.169 Such a claim does not threaten the principle of indefeasibility as A is 
exercising their contractual right to set aside the transaction. Just as it is unobjec-
tionable to ask the court to enforce a valid and binding contract against a 
registered proprietor, it is also similarly unobjectionable, as in this case, to assert 
the legal consequences of a vitiating factor to the underlying contract which led 
to the transfer of the land. 
VIII   CONCLUSION 
Commentators in many Torrens jurisdictions have long lamented that the scope 
of the in personam exception has yet to be fully explored.170 In this article, I have 
attempted to address this concern and flesh out a framework in which to analyse 
the in personam exception. To recap, the salient features of the framework are as 
follows: (1) the prima facie position is that personal claims which are known in 
law or equity may be brought against the registered proprietor unless these 
claims directly or indirectly detract from the principle of indefeasibility; (2) the 
personal claims must arise from the conduct of the registered proprietor, which 
must amount to something more than merely becoming the new registered 
proprietor; (3) the claims against the registered proprietor may have a personal or 
proprietary consequence; (4) the courts should move away from analysing the in 
personam exception using vague notions of unconscionability; and (5) in limited 
cases where there are very strong policy reasons, a personal claim should be 
allowed even if it does detract from the principle of indefeasibility. The main 
challenge is to determine which kinds of personal claims, if allowed, would 
substantively undermine the principle of indefeasibility of title. Finally, in 
 
167 David Securities Pty Ltd v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (1992) 175 CLR 353, 384 
(Mason CJ, Deane, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ). For an excellent overview of the defence, 
see Jessica Palmer, ‘Chasing a Will-o’-the-Wisp? Making Sense of Bad Faith and Wrongdoers in 
Change of Position’ [2005] Restitution Law Review 53. 
168 See, eg, Susan Barkehall-Thomas, ‘Change of Position, Good Faith and Unconscionability’ in 
Michael Bryan (ed), Private Law in Theory and Practice (2007) 289. See also Tang Hang Wu, 
‘The Role of Negligence and Non-Financial Detriment in the Law of Unjust Enrichment’ [2006] 
Restitution Law Review 55. 
169 See Tutt v Doyle (1997) 42 NSWLR 10. See also Minister for Education and Training v Canham 
(2004) NSW ConvR ¶56-080, where a retransfer was ordered because the defendant knew of the 
plaintiff’s mistake in conveying more land than was contractually bargained for. 
170 See, eg, Stevens, above n 85. See also Crown, ‘Equity Trumps the Torrens System’, above n 14, 
415, where the in personam exception is described as inherently vague. 
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certain circumstances such as the facts presented in the case of Garcia,171 the 
public policy reasons to allowing the claim is so strong that the courts may 
favour this interest over the principle of indefeasibility of title. It has not been 
possible in this article to analyse all forms of personal claims which may be 
brought against the registered proprietor. Nevertheless, it is suggested that the 
framework set out in this article would provide a principled starting point in 
analysing the ambit of the in personam exception. 
 
171 (1998) 194 CLR 395. 
